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t is always a pleasure to return to St. Louis and
to Washington University and to see so many
friends and former colleagues. But it is a special
pleasure to be here for this occasion, the Homer
Jones Lecture. Homer Jones was still active at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis when I arrived
at Washington University in 1969, and his wife,
Alice, was a faculty member in the economics
department. I had the pleasure of getting to know
both. Homer was special in many ways. He was,
of course, a leader in building the research depart-
ment of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
in orienting it toward a monetarist perspective.
But there was also the remarkable contrast of his
strong convictions and his gentle manner. It was a
combination to both admire and emulate. I admit
I may have been more successful in emulating the
strong convictions than the gentle manner. But
that only makes me admire Homer even more.
I can remember vividly my first visit to St. Louis
and Washington University in early 1969. I was a
graduate student at MIT visiting the university in
search of an appointment as an assistant professor
of economics. I was picked up at the airport and
delivered to my hotel, in advance of my seminar at
the university the following day. When I walked into
my hotel room, a small sign on a desk immediately
caught my attention. It read: “Money matters.” My
first reaction was awe at the reach of the St. Louis
Fed. They take this monetarism bit pretty seriously,
I thought. It turned out in fact to be an ad for a local
commercial bank, not for the St. Louis Fed. But the
story about this incident provided a humorous open-
ing to my seminar the next day. I was nervous, so
getting the seminar off to a good start with an amus-
ing story helped. It gave me momentum. And look
where I ended up.
So when I considered topics for the Homer Jones
Lecture, I thought of monetarism and the role of
money. My mind quickly took me back to that inci-
dent, and I took as my title, “Does Money Matter?”
What I had in mind was an assessment of mone-
tarism’s role in shaping current thinking about
macroeconomic modeling and the conduct of
monetary policy.
I often start my papers working back from my
conclusion. Monetarism is about money, but money
plays no explicit role in today’s consensus macro
model. It plays virtually no role in the conduct of
monetary policy, at least in the United States. The
conclusion appeared to be, therefore, that mone-
tarism has had no influence on either macroecon-
omics or monetary policy. That conclusion was a
problem: I did not want to write that paper for the
Homer Jones Lecture.
I decided, therefore, to take a completely novel
approach to this paper. I would postpone writing
the conclusion until I had written the paper. So I
invite you to share my journey in search of a con-
clusion. I will start by outlining the essential features
of monetarism, set out my interpretation of today’s
consensus macro model, and interpret the role of
monetarism in shaping this consensus. Whatever
the lasting influence of monetarism, this journey
will still find no explicit role for money in the con-
sensus model and little or no explicit role in the
current practice of monetary policy, at least in the
United States. This leads me to explore whether
current models and current practice undervalue
the role of money.
MONEY AND MONETARISM
In my view, monetarism has several essential
features. First and foremost, monetarism is the
reincarnation of classical macroeconomics, with
its focus on the long-run properties of the economy
as opposed to short-run dynamics.
Classical macroeconomics emphasized several
key long-run properties of the economy, including
the neutrality of money and the quantity theory of
money. Neutrality holds if the equilibrium values
of real variables—including the level of output—
are independent of the level of the money supply
in the long run. Superneutrality holds when real
variables—including the rate of growth of output—
are independent of the rate of growth in the money
supply in the long run. The quantity theory of
money holds that prices move proportionately to
changes in the money supply so that inflation is
linked to money growth. Together, these proposi-
tions identify both what monetary policy can
achieve and what it cannot achieve and therefore
delineate the responsibilities of central banks. They
mean that central banks have no effect on the level
This paper was prepared for the Homer Jones Lecture, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, March 28, 2001. Laurence H. Meyer is a member of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.or growth rate of output in the long run but do deter-
mine the rate of inflation in the long run.1
Second, monetarism focuses less on the struc-
ture of the economy and short-run dynamics and
more on longer-run conclusions, such as the long-
run relationship between money and output and
money and inflation. This focus reflects, in part, a
skepticism about our ability to understand or to
adequately quantify the structural linkages and
dynamics. For this reason, monetarists tend to prefer
reduced-form equations or VARs to structural equa-
tions or structural econometric models and focus
more on long-run results rather than short-run
dynamics.
Third, monetarists are skeptical of the ability
to use monetary policy for short-run stabilization,
despite the fact that they believe short-run variations
in money growth do affect aggregate demand and
hence output. As a result, they favor rules, often
passive rules, that focus on achieving a rate of
money growth consistent with price stability in the
long run, with no adjustment to cushion short-run
fluctuations in aggregate demand.2 This preference
reflects again the uncertainty about the structure
of the economy and about short-run dynamics and
the long and variable lags in the response of aggre-
gate demand to changes in the money supply.
There is an overriding theme across these
features of monetarism: They focus on the role of
money and the conclusion that “money matters.”
Money matters—indeed it is just about all that
matters—for inflation in the long run. Given the
widespread commitment to price stability, mone-
tarists believe that central banks should therefore
give appropriate attention to money growth in the
conduct of monetary policy.
THE CONSENSUS MACRO MODEL:
MONETARISM WITHOUT MONEY?
One way to judge the influence of monetarism
is by the conformity of today’s consensus macro
model with monetarism’s central features, as set
out above.
One of my favorite sayings about economists
is, “Two economists, three opinions.” That saying
is more true of macroeconomists than of micro-
economists. For that reason, defining a consensus
macro model has always been a challenge. But I
believe there has been some convergence toward
a consensus in recent years. This consensus is typi-

















gequals the output gap (the percentage
point difference between actual and potential
output), R equals nominal interest rate, r* equals
equilibrium real interest rate, p equals inflation, p
T
equals inflation target, x and z are stochastic
shocks, and all the coefficients are positive.
The model includes an aggregate demand
equation, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy
rule. The aggregate demand equation, given by
equation (1), is essentially a dynamic version of the
old IS curve, in which the level of output (in this case
the output gap) depends on the real interest rate.
This specification allows for effects of both lagged
output and expectations about future output. The
Phillips curve, given by equation (2), relates the
inflation rate to the output gap (measuring the
balance between supply and demand in the output
market) and to both past inflation and inflation
expectations. The effect of past inflation captures
the role of sticky prices, while inflation expectations
are assumed to be set, as in equation (1), according
to rational expectations. The policy rule, equation
(3), relates the interest rate, viewed as the instrument
of monetary policy, to the output gap and the differ-
ence between inflation and the central bank’s infla-
tion target. That is, policy is adjusted in response to
the deviations of output and inflation from their
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1 Superneutrality is more controversial than neutrality. Indeed, the
fundamental justification for a price stability objective is that inflation
undermines the efficiency of the economy and perhaps distorts saving
and investment choices. What is essential is that monetary policy
cannot raise the level or growth rate of output by increasing the rate
of money growth.
2 Many monetarists came to believe that short-run variations in money
growth had significant effects on real variables in the short run. The
important effects of variations in money growth for short-run econ-
omic activity were demonstrated in empirical research conducted at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, notably by Andersen and Jordan
(1968) and by Andersen and Carlson (1970). But skepticism about the
ability to harness this effect for use in stabilization policy remained.
Still, as Hafer and Wheelock (2001) have noted, there was a temptation,
not always resisted, to use the short-run relationship to prescribe a
monetarist strategy for stabilization policy.
3 See, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999), and McCallum (2000).respective objectives—full employment and price
stability.4
There are at least three innovations in the con-
sensus model compared with the IS-LM framework,
perhaps yesterday’s consensus model. First, the
IS-LM model had two equations and three unknowns
and therefore could be solved only by assuming
that either the price level or the output level was
fixed. Today’s consensus model allows for both
sticky prices in the short run and full price flexibility
in the long run by introducing the Phillips curve. In
effect, the Phillips curve pins down the degree to
which prices are sticky in the short run, allowing
scope for both short-run movements in actual out-
put relative to potential and for stabilization policy,
while providing a mechanism that ensures a transi-
tion to the long-run classic equilibrium.
Second, today’s consensus model replaces the
LM equation with a policy rule. The LM curve
expresses the equilibrium condition in the money
market, the balance between the supply of and the
demand for money. Implicitly, the money supply is
treated as the instrument of monetary policy. The
policy rule in today’s consensus model specifies
the way policymakers adjust the interest rate to
economic developments. This specification has the
advantage of more accurately capturing the prevail-
ing operating procedure at central banks around the
world, given that they, almost without exception,
implement monetary policy by setting a target for
some key interest rate. It also reflects a more modern
view of “policy” as a systematic adjustment of the
policy instrument or instruments to ongoing econ-
omic developments rather than simply as an exoge-
nous process, outside the model.
Third, the model explicitly incorporates forward-
looking elements in economic behavior and accounts
for the importance of expectations. In the eclectic
form presented here, the model allows for both
forward-looking elements and lagged adjustment
due, for example, to adjustment costs.
The consensus model is widely used in teaching
macroeconomics and in policy analysis, specifically
in evaluating the properties of alternative policy
rules. Larger-scale macro models used for policy
analysis and forecasting typically have richer struc-
tures, including a more richly defined set of mone-
tary policy channels. This set generally includes a
range of interest rates and asset prices and the
exchange rate, but almost never a direct or indepen-
dent role for money. This is true of the FRB-US model
used by the staff at the Board of Governors for policy
analysis and forecasting. That model has a structure
very much consistent with this simple consensus
model in that its aggregate demand and inflation
equations, for example, have the same mix of lagged
adjustment and forward-looking expectations and its
interest rate determination is anchored by a policy
rule.
So what is the influence of monetarism on
today’s consensus model? On the one hand, the
model has no apparent role for money. On the
surface, therefore, today’s consensus model appears
to be a clear and definitive rejection of the “money
matters” focus of monetarism. On the other hand,
the classic properties I outlined hold in this model
(at least if we redefine them in terms of “monetary
policy” rather than the “money supply”). Monetary
policy does not affect the level or growth rate of
potential output, and inflation is determined by
monetary policy in that it converges to a target set
by the central bank in the policy rule.
My conclusion, therefore, is that we can still
clearly see the influence of monetarism in the con-
sensus model. Monetarism focused attention on the
role of the central bank in determining inflation by
emphasizing the relation between money and infla-
tion. The consensus model may bypass money, but
it has retained the key conclusion that central banks
ultimately determine the inflation rate.
The relation among money, output, and inflation
is obviously beneath the surface of this model. We
could bring it to the surface by simply appending
yesterday’s LM curve to today’s consensus model.
This provides a fourth equation and a fourth vari-
able, the money supply. The LM curve, however,
is not part of the simultaneous structure of the
expanded model. The first three equations deter-
mine output, interest rate, and inflation without
calling upon the LM curve. All the LM curve does is
determine the level of the nominal money supply
consistent with solutions for output, prices, and
the interest rate. In effect, the LM curve identifies
the amount of money that the central bank will
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4 The effect of supply and demand shocks on the evolution of real
economic activity is not clear in this specification. In the simple
specification I have used, the effect of supply shocks is hidden in the
measure of potential output, part of the output gap variable, and in the
shock term in the Phillips curve. The last several years have height-
ened appreciation that shocks to the level of potential output (arising,
for example, from changes in the non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment) or to the growth rate of potential output (arising from
shocks to structural productivity growth) play an important role in
shaping short-run as well as long-run movements in real economic
activity. find that it has to supply when it follows the policy
rule, given the shocks to the economy. So the money
supply has become a less interesting, minor endoge-
nous variable in the story.
This approach, however, is not inconsistent with
a stable empirical relationship between money
growth and other economic variables, specifically
between money growth and inflation. In fact, if the
money demand equation (underlying the LM curve)
is stable, there will be a stable relationship between
money and inflation in the long run.
The expanded model also makes clear that
there is nothing inconsistent with a stable long-
run relationship between money and inflation, as
emphasized by monetarists, and the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve, a mainstay in Keynesian-
type structural models as well as a part of today’s
consensus macro model. The monetarist proposi-
tion is about an outcome, a result. This conclusion
about the long-run relationship between money and
prices is implicit in the consensus model, provided
the money demand equation is stable. The consensus
structural model is also about structure or process.
It explains how monetary stimulus raises inflation.
The consensus model remains consistent with
a relationship between money growth and inflation,
but it appears to downgrade the role of money. But
does it shortchange the role of money? In a search
for answers, I will focus on monetary policy in Japan
and on the differing role of money in the conduct
of monetary policy by the European Central Bank
and the Federal Reserve.
THE MONETIZATION DEBATE:
DOES THE CONSENSUS MODEL
SHORTCHANGE THE ROLE OF MONEY?
In Japan, the policy interest rate was taken to
zero and remains close to zero. Zero is the logical
lower bound for the nominal rate because, if the
interest rate were negative, everyone would prefer
to hold cash and there would be no demand for
bonds. But even with a short-term policy rate nearly
at zero, the Japanese economy remains weak, and a
case can be made for additional monetary stimulus.
However, according to the consensus model, once
the policy rate is taken to zero, the central bank has
exhausted its ability to stimulate the economy.
Monetarists, among others, reject this conclu-
sion. They argue that Japan should embark on a
strategy of monetization, or quantitative easing, and
judge the stimulus of its policies in terms of the rate
of growth in the money supply, not by the level of
its policy rate. The Bank of Japan has recently
taken a step in the direction of such a monetization
strategy.
There are two paths to the conclusion that such
a strategy will allow monetary policy to provide
additional stimulus, even once the policy rate is
driven to zero. First, some monetarists argue that
money directly affects aggregate demand. That is,
the IS curve in the consensus model is misspecified
because it allows only for an interest-rate channel
of influence and not for a direct effect of money on
spending. Plug in the money supply as an additional
determinant of aggregate demand and, presto,
monetization works! Second, even if money does
not directly affect aggregate demand, the transmis-
sion mechanism is certainly more complicated than
the simple IS curve specification suggests. Money
could play a role in structural equations for aggregate
demand, or in VARs, as a proxy for channels that
may be difficult to quantify or were simply left out.
Personally, I do not believe that there is a direct
effect of money on aggregate demand. But I may
be biased. My view is based in part on my own
research. I tested and rejected the hypothesis of
such a direct effect in my dissertation. In my dis-
sertation I also tested the proxy role hypothesis
and rejected it, too. But, the proxy role for money
deserves further attention.5
When leading monetarists, such as Milton
Friedman, have discussed the transmission mech-
anism, they have described monetary policy as
operating through a broad range of interest rates
and asset prices.6 As I noted earlier, large-scale struc-
tural models also incorporate a much more detailed
treatment of the channels of monetary policy—
including not only a range of after-tax real interest
rates but also equity prices and the real exchange
rate—compared with the single policy rate in the
consensus model. The consensus model adequately
4 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
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5 Large-scale models allow for the well-known real balance effect.
Increases in real money balances that raise the real value of net worth
operate through the wealth effect in such models. However, open
market operations involve an exchange of money for bonds and
therefore do not directly alter household wealth. McCallum (2000)
and Svensson (2001) discuss conditions under which money could
directly affect aggregate demand. Svensson summarizes the conditions
as follows: “[A] direct money effect would arise if real balances entered
the representative agent’s utility function and this utility function
was not additively separable in consumption and real balances but
had a positive cross derivative.” Svensson and McCallum agree that,
for reasonable parameter values, this effect is likely to be so small
that it can be disregarded.
6 Friedman and Meiselman (1963).summarizes this transmission mechanism with a
single policy rate under two assumptions: First,
monetary policy operates by changing some short-
term interest rate; second, all other interest rates
and asset prices are linked, directly or indirectly, to
the policy rate through stable and predictable arbi-
trage relationships.
Monetary policy might still have life left in it,
even after the policy rate has been driven to zero,
if monetary policy operations could somehow affect
the spreads between the policy rate and other inter-
est rates—longer-term rates and private rates—and
its relationship to other asset prices, such as equity
prices or exchange rates.
In simple theoretical models, such an effect is
possible as long as short-term government bonds
are not perfect substitutes for longer-term bonds,
private bonds, equities, and foreign financial assets.
In this case, open market operations in long-term
government bonds could in principle lower the long-
term government bond rate relative to the policy
rate, with spillover effects on longer-term private
rates. Monetary policy in short-term private assets,
such as commercial paper, could not only lower
private rates relative to government rates but also
allow the central bank to work around an ailing
banking system. Finally, open market operations
involving foreign financial assets—effectively
unsterilized intervention in the foreign exchange
markets—could, in principle, affect exchange rates.
However, there is really no substantive difference
between sterilized and unsterilized operations when
the short-term interest rate is already zero.
One way in which open market operations in
other assets might affect other rates or other asset
prices would be if there were relative asset-supply
effects determining longer-term private rates and
exchange rates. For example, if the relative supplies
of short- and longer-term government bonds affected
their relative yields, open market purchases of long-
term bonds could lower long-term rates relative to
the already near-zero short-term rate. Whether or
not the relative supply effects are significant is then
an empirical question. The traditional answer has
been that such effects, though possible, are negli-
gible and, effectively, not a useful part of monetary
policy. And even if monetization could push long-
term rates to zero, there is no guarantee that will
provide enough stimulus, given the prevailing defla-
tion. The real bond rate could still be too high.
This proxy role for money could, in principle,
cover other channels besides long-term government
and private interest rates and asset prices—such as
liquidity and credit effects—that might be activated
by increases in the money supply. In this case, even
additional conventional operations—open market
operations in Treasury bills—might stimulate aggre-
gate demand, even if they could not further lower
the short-term nominal interest rate. However, that
affect does not seem very plausible. For example,
would the increased liquidity of holding money
versus short-term bills stimulate aggregate demand?
If economic agents wanted the additional liquidity,
they could have acquired it with no holding cost by
selling zero-interest-rate bills and acquiring cash.
Why, when the central bank initiates this change,
would it affect spending if no interest rates or asset
prices were affected?
Bernanke and Gertler have emphasized a credit
channel as part of the transmission mechanism.7
But this channel—though amplifying the effect of
monetary policy—seems itself to require a change
in interest rates. For example, a decline in interest
rates would, according to Bernanke and Gertler,
reduce existing committed cash flows of borrowers
and therefore make the borrower more creditworthy.
This, in turn, could result in lenders offering addi-
tional credit. However, if interest rates do not decline,
this channel is not activated.8
Finally, the proxy role for money could include
the effect of monetization on expectations. This
channel depends on the ability of policymakers to
alter expectations about the course and effects of
future policy. That is, the policy effect does not
derive from a higher money supply today but from
a perceived commitment to a higher money stock
in the future.
Expectation effects could alter current long-term
real interest rates in two ways. First, convincing the
public that monetary policy will remain stimulative
longer will lower expected future nominal short-
term interest rates and therefore longer-term nom-
inal interest rates.9 Second, convincing the public
that monetary policy will achieve a higher inflation
rate in the future, at least on average, could lower
expected current longer-term real interest rates,
reinforcing the effect on expected long-term interest
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7 Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
8 Clouse et al. (2000).
9 I am assuming a standard expectations theory of the term structure
of interest rates and constant risk premiums. Long-term interest rates
are, in this case, an average of current and expected future short-term
interest rates.rates of a perceived commitment to a given path
for the nominal policy rate.
These effects can be illustrated in terms of a
simple model with two-period (non-overlapping)
price contracts. The current and expected future
one-period nominal interest rates determine the
current nominal interest rate on the two-period
bond. Assume that the current one-period interest
rate (the policy rate) has been driven to zero, but
that the public expects a positive rate on the one-
period bond next period. If policymakers can con-
vince the public that policymakers will drive the
one-period rate to zero in period two, the interest
rate on the two-period bond will fall in the first
period, stimulating aggregate demand.
The first channel thus operates by lowering the
expected future nominal policy rate, thereby low-
ering current longer-term nominal interest rates.
Essentially, it tries to lower nominal rates further
along the term structure, once the short-term policy
rate has been driven to zero. It depends on the credi-
bility of the policy authorities to pre-commit to a
more stimulative policy in the future—for example,
to maintain the zero rate policy for a longer period
than is now anticipated.
The second way in which expectations can
affect current real long-term interest rates involves
the effect of policy on inflation expectations. In
order for this effect to work, policymakers must
first convince the public that policymakers will
maintain a given path for the short-term nominal
policy rate; thus the second effect builds upon and
reinforces the first effect. The second effect, by
convincing the public that inflation will be higher
in the future, converts the perceived commitment
to a given path for the short-term nominal policy
rate to a decline in future expected short-term real
interest rates and hence in current expected longer-
term real interest rates.
Note that it is sufficient for policymakers to
convince the public that inflation will be higher
than otherwise only for a while, not indefinitely.
This is important, given that a promise to maintain
higher inflation indefinitely might be neither neces-
sary nor credible. One way to activate the inflation-
expectations effect to stimulate aggregate demand
in the short run, without compromising the longer-
run inflation objective, would be to implement a
target price level. The central bank would promise,
for example, to target prices at a predetermined
constant level and would indicate in advance the
period over which it would attempt to return to the
price-level target. If deflation follows, a price-level
target implies that the central bank will target rising
prices—or inflation—for a while in order to return
the price level to its target level. The longer deflation
lasts, the higher or longer lasting the expected future
inflation. Once higher inflation restored the initial
price level, the objective would again be price stabil-
ity and, hence, zero inflation. A similar motivation
underlies calls for the Bank of Japan to adopt an
inflation-targeting strategy.10 That is, by announcing
an explicit inflation target, the Bank of Japan might
raise expectations of future inflation and therefore
lower real long-term interest rates today.
On the one hand, simply undertaking monetiza-
tion operations without effectively communicating
the intention with respect to future policy might not
be effective. On the other hand, simply announcing
an inflation target without carrying out operations
today that might support the objective also might not
be effective. However, doing both—carrying out
monetization operations in support of an inflation
target—could possibly activate the expectations
effect.
The relative supply effect is likely to be so small
that it is not relevant to the conduct of monetary
policy in normal periods. This channel, therefore, is
perhaps only of interest when the nominal interest
rate has been driven to zero, when further policy
stimulus is desired, and when the size of policy
operations could be much larger than in normal
times. However, the expectations channel—the
effect of expectations about future monetary policy
on long-term real interest rates and hence on aggre-
gate demand today—is, I believe, an important part
of the transmission mechanism both in normal
periods and in the more extreme circumstances.
Despite uncertainties about the effectiveness
of monetization operations, we may have to think
more seriously about them when the policy rate
has been taken to zero and there is still a case for
further monetary stimulus. The problem is that, if
there is a possibility of providing stimulus through
monetization, we are not likely to find it by experi-
menting with such operations at the margin, espe-
cially if the stimulus arises through relative supply
effects. To have any promise of significant results,
such unconventional policy operations more likely
would need to be implemented on a bold scale.
Moving in this direction is understandably difficult
6 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
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10 See, for example, Krugman (1998).when there is uncertainty about the effectiveness
of the approach.
A fuller consideration of this topic would require
us to assess the costs of such operations and the
ways these costs balance against the cost of not
pursuing this direction in a period of persistent
deflation.11 If the costs are low, there is little damage
if the operations are ineffective. But I will not try
here to reach a conclusion on the overall merits of
monetization. My objective was to use the current
debate about monetary policy in Japan to highlight
channels of monetary policy and a possible role for
monetary policy at the zero bound, which are left
out of the consensus model.
Let me now sum up conclusions about the
absence of any role for money in the consensus
model. First, the consensus model incorporates a
caricature of the consensus view of the determina-
tion of output and inflation, including the transmis-
sion mechanism. In effect, it treats “the” interest
rate as an index of overall financial conditions,
assuming that long-term interest rates, equity prices,
and the exchange rate all move in a stable and pre-
dictable way with changes in the policy rate. To be
sure, this is a considerable simplification, and some
of the shortcomings become apparent when the
policy rate is driven to the zero nominal bound.
Second, though the consensus model has its
shortcomings, the absence of money is not one of
them—except perhaps for the zero nominal bound
case. As just noted, the consensus model significantly
oversimplifies the transmission mechanism. It also
oversimplifies the supply side of the economy—
failing, in particular, to model the complex dynamics
of the economy’s response to an unexpected accel-
eration in structural productivity growth.
Third, in situations where the policy rate has
been driven to the zero nominal bound—as is the
case in Japan today—what the consensus model is
missing (i.e., the proxy role for money) becomes
the only remaining leverage for monetary policy.
Interestingly, larger macro models do not do much
better either, as they typically do not allow for rela-
tive asset-supply effects and often do not provide
opportunity for the inflation-expectations effects
that might be so important. In this case, money
growth could be a valuable indicator of the degree
of current and intended future stimulus to be pro-
vided by monetary policy.
Fourth, understanding the ways in which mon-
etary policy might still provide additional stimulus—
once the nominal policy rate had been driven to
zero—may also provide us with a richer understand-
ing of how monetary policy works in normal times.
In particular, the monetization debate highlights the
role that expectations play—in both normal and
more extreme circumstances—in the effect of mone-
tary policy on aggregate demand. Indeed, it has
become increasingly clear that monetary policy
works not only through decisions about the policy
rate taken at each meeting but also by the expecta-
tions that policymakers encourage—intentionally
or otherwise—about expected future policy. The
language in the statement issued at the end of FOMC
meetings and the statement about the balance of
risks, as well as comments from FOMC members
between meetings, can affect those expectations.
Those expectations, in turn, have immediate effects
on longer-term interest rates, on asset prices, and on
real exchange rates—channels of monetary policy
that are not directly incorporated in the consensus
model.
MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY AT
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND
THE FEDERAL RESERVE
The consensus model implies that monetary
policy is conducted by setting a target for a policy
interest rate, without any consideration given to
the prevailing rate of money growth. Does such an
operating strategy undervalue the usefulness of
money in the conduct of monetary policy?
This question takes on added interest because
of two recent and seemingly contradictory develop-
ments. The European Central Bank (ECB), a new
central bank, has a two-pillar strategy, one pillar
being a reference value for money growth. The
Federal Reserve, in sharp contrast, asked to be and
was relieved of the requirement to report semiannu-
ally on its target ranges for the growth of monetary
and credit aggregates. In this section, I discuss the
evolution of money growth targets at the Federal
Reserve and the role of the reference value for
money growth at the ECB. In the following section,
I discuss how a reference value for money growth
might be set for the United States and whether or
not such an approach might be constructive.
Money Growth and the Federal Reserve
Until the late 1960s, money did not play a
meaningful role in the formulation of monetary
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11 See Fujiki et al. (2001) for an assessment of the potential benefits
and risks associated with a monetization strategy in Japan.policy in the United States.12 By the end of that
decade, however, intellectual inroads by proponents
of monetarism—including important work at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—and dissatisfac-
tion with the inflationary outcomes of the policy
procedures in place, led to consideration of greater
emphasis on money in the conduct of monetary
policy.
The first conference of the well-known series
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, held in June
1969 and titled “Controlling Monetary Aggregates,”
was indicative of this trend. At the time, an FOMC
subcommittee was already investigating how the
Committee could improve its control of the money
stock. The FOMC took a small step in January 1970,
when the policy directive for the first time noted
“the Committee’s desire to see a modest growth in
money and bank credit” as one of the factors to be
taken into account in implementing monetary policy.
The Fed was operating then, as now, essentially
by setting a target for the federal funds rate. But
during this period it began to set short-run targets
for money growth: two-month targets set for each
intermeeting period calibrated to be consistent with
its policy objectives. The federal funds rate was then
set at a level that was estimated to be consistent
with achieving the money-growth target. I was on
leave from Washington University at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York in 1975-76 and wrote
from time to time the periodic staff memo that set
out the funds rate target estimated to be consistent
with the money-growth range. However, when
money growth deviated from this short-run target,
it was more likely that the money-growth target was
reset than it was that the interest rate was adjusted.
In addition, the target was rebased for each meeting,
so that past errors were typically ignored.
In 1975, reflecting in part the monetarist critique
of monetary policymaking and in part disappoint-
ment with recent macroeconomic performance,
the Congress passed a concurrent resolution encour-
aging the Federal Reserve to set targets for the
money supply. Following the passage of this reso-
lution, the FOMC adopted for the first time annual
target ranges for money growth and announced
them publicly. The Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978 required the Fed to set, semi-
annually, monetary targets for calendar years and
to explain any deviations from the targets.
From 1979 to 1982, money-growth targets took
on an even more central role in the conduct of pol-
icy. Policy was implemented during this period by
estimating the total reserve growth necessary to
meet the money-growth target and by holding to
the associated path for nonborrowed reserves. In
the process, the federal funds rate was free to move
to whatever level would be consistent with the
money-growth objective over time. Monetary policy
was focused on steadily reducing inflation, and
policymakers were less certain about what increase
in nominal and real interest rates would be required
to achieve the objective of reducing inflation than
they were about the money-inflation relationship.
Moreover, it served the interests of policymakers to
emphasize that the markets, not policymakers, were
controlling interest rates along the way.
At the outset, the money-growth ranges were
interpreted as intermediate objectives, with the
ultimate objective being to reduce inflation. The
1979 monetary policy report described the policy
as “the gradual reduction of rates of increase of the
monetary aggregates in order to curb inflation.”
The initial ranges for money growth were high to
reflect the prevailing inflation rate but were to be
gradually lowered over time.
Initially, growth targets were set for M1, M2, and
bank credit, although the emphasis was on the M1
measure. But, after the downward shift in velocity
for M1, associated with the introduction of nation-
wide NOW accounts and other innovations, the
FOMC downplayed its M1 target in late 1982 and
shifted emphasis to M2 and M3.
With deregulation and innovation making
velocity less predictable, in late 1982 the FOMC
also began a gradual return toward an interest-rate
operating strategy. The monetary aggregate targets
were described as being “set with the aim of slowing
the expansion of money over time to rates consis-
tent with the economy’s productive potential at
reasonably stable prices.” Money-growth targets
were evolving toward a point when they would be
consistent with the FOMC’s price-stability objective.
In 1995, the language describing the money-
growth ranges changed in an important way. Up to
that point, the money-growth target ranges appeared
to apply to the period immediately ahead and were
being gradually adjusted to be consistent with a
transition toward lower inflation. The money-growth
ranges were reinterpreted at this time to apply not
to the period immediately ahead but rather to some
intermediate and hypothetical period when price
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12 For a good discussion of the evolution of the role of money in mone-
tary policy, see Ann-Marie Meulendyke (1998).stability would be achieved and the pattern of
velocity would be “normal.” The purpose of the M2
growth rate range was “to serve as a benchmark
for a rate of growth of M2 that would be expected
under conditions of reasonable price stability and
historical velocity behavior.” The same language was
used thereafter, until the Congress last year removed
the requirement that money-growth ranges be
reported to the Congress.
There are two explanations for this change in
1995 in the interpretation of the money-growth
ranges. First, the new approach reflected a reduced
willingness of policymakers to adjust monetary
policy in response to deviations of money growth
relative to the target range. This reluctance reflected
the diminished confidence of policymakers in the
signal from such deviations as a result of the unex-
pected jump in and continued volatility of velocity.
Second, the new approach was better tuned to the
lower and more stable inflation rate by the mid-
1990s. Previously, money-growth ranges had been
gradually lowered to signal the intent to lower infla-
tion and to be consistent with gradual decline in
inflation. The fixed range set in the mid-1990s was
consistent with price stability, an objective now in
reach.
Money and the ECB Two-Pillar Strategy
The Maastrich treaty identifies price stability
as the overriding objective for the ECB. Like the Fed
and other central banks, the ECB chooses to imple-
ment its policy by setting a target for a short-term
interest rate. But the ECB also gives a more promi-
nent role to the money supply than the Fed does
today.13
The ECB has set out a two-pillar strategy for
guiding its adjustment of interest rates in pursuit of
price stability.14 The first pillar is a reference value
for money growth. The ECB sets a reference value
for a single monetary aggregate, the M3 definition
that is essentially the same as the M2 definition for
the United States. The ECB reference value is the
rate of M3 growth consistent with achieving its infla-
tion target over an intermediate term, based on
estimates of trend growth in potential output and
velocity. The second pillar considers the appropri-
ate setting for the policy rate in terms of the wide
range of information available and the prospect for
inflation over the medium term.
The ECB rationale for the reference value for
M3 is the long-run stable relationship between its
rate of growth and inflation. The reference value
provides a second check for policymakers to ensure
that monetary policy, set in terms of the ECB’s policy
rate and in consideration of pillar 2, is consistent
with price stability. The ECB is very explicit about
the fact that, in light of the short-term volatility of
velocity, short-run deviations of money growth
from the reference value might provide little useful
information that would help policymakers adjust
the stance of monetary policy. But in light of the
more stable longer-term relationship, continued
deviations would raise significant questions and
should, at the least, require a careful reassessment
of whether the prevailing monetary policy is consis-
tent with the inflation objective.
The ECB uses the term “reference value” rather
than a target to make clear that deviations from the
reference value will not necessarily result in policy
adjustments to encourage a return of money growth
to the reference value. Each year the ECB updates
its estimate for potential output growth and, if nec-
essary, updates the reference value to ensure that it
is lined up on the inflation target.
A REFERENCE VALUE FOR M2 FOR
THE UNITED STATES?
The ECB approach to the reference value for
M3 is very close to the way in which the Fed was
setting its benchmark range for M2 until the recent
revision to the Federal Reserve Act. The major dif-
ferences are that the Fed was perhaps somewhat
less transparent about how it derived the range for
M2 and did not update it regularly to maintain an
estimated consistency with an unchanged trend
inflation rate objective. At any rate, the recent change
in the Federal Reserve Act removed the requirement
that the Federal Reserve report to the Congress on
growth ranges for M2 and other money and credit
aggregates. My final topic is whether setting a refer-
ence value for money growth would be constructive
for the FOMC and, if so, how such an approach
would be implemented.
To move in this direction would have the advan-
tage of allowing money growth once again to play
a role as a failsafe, or second check, on the consis-
tency of monetary policy with the FOMC’s medium-
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13 The Bank of Canada also assigns the monetary aggregates a more
prominent role in the conduct of monetary policy. Freedman (2000)
provides a summary of the role of the monetary aggregates at the
Bank of Canada.
14 See Angeloni et al. (2000) for a thorough discussion of the role of the
money-growth reference value in the overall policy strategy of the ECB.term inflation objective. On the other hand, moving
in this direction would require other significant
changes in the conduct of policy. The FOMC—pre-
sumably in consultation with the Congress—would
have to establish an explicit inflation target and
would have to reveal its estimate of the rate of
growth in potential output. This direction would
itself be even a more significant step than setting a
reference value for money growth. An intermediate
approach might be to set a reference value based on
implicit assumptions about both the target inflation
rate and the rate of growth of potential output—
without explicitly identifying either. This would be
similar to how the benchmark range was set for M2
in the last few years before the benchmark ranges
for the monetary aggregates were abandoned.
A Money Growth Reference Value and
the Consensus Model
But why would monitoring money growth be
useful, as long as policymakers followed a disci-
plined policy of adjusting their policy rate to ongo-
ing economic developments, as reflected in the
policy rule in the consensus model? It is well known
that holding nominal interest rates fixed in the face
of aggregate demand shocks can lead to monetary
policy, in effect, reinforcing rather than damping
such shocks. The FOMC instructs the manager of
the System Open Market Account to hit a given
interest rate target. If upward pressure on rates
arises, for example, from higher nominal income
growth or higher inflation expectations, the manager
will automatically add reserves with open market
operations to prevent a rise in the funds rate above
its target. Hence, absent a change in the stance of
policy, a positive demand shock automatically leads
to higher reserve growth and hence higher money
growth, in effect reinforcing the demand shock. The
faster money supply growth relative to some refer-
ence value, in this case, would alert policymakers
to the possibility that the policy stance was no longer
consistent with its objectives. Policymakers would
still have to evaluate whether the more-rapid money
growth reflected a shift in money demand or a
shock to aggregate demand.
However, the policy rule in the consensus model
is designed to prevent precisely this type of persistent
error in the response to shocks. If there is an aggre-
gate demand shock, its effect on utilization rates and
inflation will result in an adjustment of the policy
rate over time that is consistent with policymakers’
objectives for output and inflation. In effect, the
policy rule substitutes for the discipline of a money
growth target in the face of aggregate demand shocks.
So what value would a reference value for
money growth have if policy were in fact conducted
in a manner consistent with the policy rule? First,
the policy rule is an attempt to summarize the
systematic responses of policymakers. Policymakers
do not, of course, commit to follow such a rule. So,
having an additional check on the consistency of
policy with medium-term objectives could be useful
when policymakers choose not to adjust policy in
line with the policy rule. Second, even if the rule
were adhered to, another check might be useful. In
particular, the difficulty in implementing the policy
rule in practice makes a reference value for money
growth valuable.
If the policy rule were lined up precisely on the
equilibrium real interest rate and if the output gap
were calibrated correctly relative to potential output,
the benefits from monitoring money growth might
be limited to its early signal of changes in output
and inflation. But recent experience, along with
the earlier experience of the 1970s, suggests that
uncertainty about the real equilibrium interest rate
and about the level of potential output makes imple-
menting the policy rule challenging. Just as model-
based forecasters often look at forecasts from VARs,
so policymakers under a policy rule might benefit
from a second check provided by a money-growth
reference value. This justification for a money-
growth reference value seems consistent with mone-
tarists’ skepticism about structural models.
An Operational Reference Value for
M2 Growth
Let me set out a possible approach to imple-
menting a reference value for money growth at the
Federal Reserve. A simple point of departure is the
famous quantity theory equation, MV=PY, where M
is the money supply, V is velocity, P is the price level,
and Y is the level of output. This can be rewritten,
in terms of growth rates, as m+v=p+y, where
lowercase letters are the growth rates of M, V, P, and
Y, respectively. Rewriting the growth relationship
as an equation for money growth,
(4) m=p+y –v.
To solve for the reference value for money growth,
we need a definition of the money supply, a target
for inflation, and estimates of the trend rate of
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growth of velocity.
I have implemented such a framework as part
of a memo prepared by the staff for me in advance
of FOMC meetings. After discussion with the staff,
it was agreed that M2 was a sensible choice, though
a case could have been made for other aggregates.
M2 has the virtue of being broad enough to internal-
ize many technological changes that would affect its
composition, such as sweeps from demand deposit
accounts to interest-bearing saving accounts, but
also narrow enough to represent assets principally
used for transactions. In the past, there has been a
preference for setting ranges for multiple aggregates,
increasing the potential for both information and
noise, but I have been focusing on M2.
If this were being developed for the FOMC, the
calibration of the reference value for M2 growth
would need to incorporate either the staff estimate
of trend growth or, still more likely, an estimate
derived from a survey of FOMC members. For my
calculation, I use my own estimate of the trend rate
of growth in potential output, with input from the
staff. It is important that this estimate be updated
at least annually to incorporate the best judgment
about the underlying trend. I am currently using 3
1/2
percent to 4 percent.
The next step is to specify the inflation target.
This is a potential problem because the FOMC has
not set an explicit numerical inflation target. It might
be more appropriate for the Congress, presumably
with input from the Fed, to set such a target given
that the Congress is responsible for setting the broad
objectives for monetary policy. At any rate, the
upside or downside of publicly reporting a reference
value is that the FOMC would have to be more
explicit about its objectives.
To calibrate my reference value, I provide the
staff with my personal inflation target. For the chain
gross domestic product (GDP) price measure, the
appropriate choice in the equation of exchange, my
inflation target is 1
1/2 percent. I allow 
1/2 percent for
measurement error and add an additional 1 percent-
age point as a “cushion,” in light of the potential
deterioration of cyclical performance in economies
operating at very low inflation rates. This would be
consistent with a 1
1/2 percent target for the personal
consumption expenditure measure of consumer
prices and about a 2 percent target for the consumer
price index, based on recent experience with the
differentials among these alternative measures of
inflation.
Finally, we consider whether adjusting the M2
reference value for a systematic trend in M2 velocity
(V2) is appropriate. Before the velocity shifts of the
early 1990s, there seemed to be a long-standing and
small, but positive, trend in V2. The pattern is no
longer clear. Of course, the velocity shift in the early
1990s was, at least at the beginning, unexpected
and unexplainable. For the reference value to be
informative, adjustments for shifts of velocity would
be necessary, and the ability to detect such shifts in
“real time” is a potential problem. At this point, we
assume that trend growth in V2 is zero.
Bringing all the steps together, my resulting
reference value for M2 growth is 5 percent to 5
1/2
percent, the sum of my inflation target and my
estimate for trend growth. Given the uncertainty
about some of the inputs to the calculation, we
might end up with a narrow range, as opposed to a
point.
The next issue is how to effectively make use
of the reference value. The purpose of the reference
value, in my view, is not to read short-run deviations
from it as signals of the need for adjustments in
policy. The short-term variability in velocity makes
the extraction of such a signal too difficult. Instead,
the purpose of the reference value is to provide a
check that might help avoid significant and persis-
tent errors that undermine the Fed’s medium-term
inflation objective.
The traditional way the Federal Reserve pre-
sented its benchmarks for money growth in the
past was the “cone” chart. Figure 1 shows the very
last such chart for M2 published by the Federal
Reserve in February 2000.15 The base of the cone
is the fourth quarter of the previous year—in this
case, the fourth quarter of 1998. The cone shows
the range of M2 paths that would be consistent with
the chosen range over the coming year. The flatter
solid line on the bottom shows the path for M2 that
would be consistent with growth at the lower end
of the benchmark range; the steeper solid line shows
the path of M2 that would be consistent with growth
at the upper end of the range. The actual path of
M2 is shown by the shaded line. This approach, in
my view, focuses too much attention on short-run
deviations in money from its target path and fails
to take into account the pattern of money growth
before the previous fourth quarter.
Perhaps a better way of using the reference
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15 This chart was published in the Monetary Policy Report in February
2000.value—focusing on its implications for medium-term
inflation—would be to compare it with a longer-run
average growth rate for M2. Figure 2, for example,
compares excess money growth relative to the refer-
ence value—using the estimates of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) for potential GDP growth—with
the deviation of inflation from its target. To focus on
more persistent deviations in money growth and
in consideration of the lags in the effect of money
growth on inflation, the Figure uses a two-year
growth rate for M2, lagged two years, to compute
the excess of money growth relative to its reference
value. This is plotted against the excess of the rate
of inflation over the previous four quarters relative
to the inflation target.
Figure 3 plots the two-year and the three-month
money growth rates. This combination offers the
opportunity to review shorter-term movements in
money supply in the context of early warnings of
more persistent deviations.
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of an M2
Reference Value for the United States
Should the FOMC reinstate benchmark growth







































































































































































NOTE: Inflation is Q4/Q4 growth rates of the GDP deflator.
Excess money is a 2-year moving average of Q4/Q4 growth
rates of actual M2 less reference value. The reference value 
is the sum of potential GDP growth, inflation of 1.5 percent,
and trend velocity of 0 percent. Potential GDP is based on 
CBO estimates for each year, published in The Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2002-11. The inflation rate 
of 1.5 percent in the GDP deflator is assumed to be 
consistent with reasonable price stability.
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growth, inflation of 1.5 percent, and trend velocity of 
0 percent. Potential GDP is based on CBO estimates for each 
year, published in The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal 
Years 2002-11. The inflation rate of 1.5 percent in the GDP 
deflator is assumed to be consistent with reasonable price 
stability.this would be most useful if the committee were
prepared to align such a reference value with an
intermediate-term inflation target and a consensus
on the growth of potential output and if it were
prepared to update the reference value or range as
its estimate of potential growth changed to maintain
consistency with the inflation target. This takes us
potentially to the broader question of whether the
Fed should have an explicit inflation target. That
will have to be the subject of another paper.
The second precondition for reinstating a
money-growth reference value or range would be
an evaluation of whether such a reference value
would have improved or undermined the conduct of
monetary policy over history. Are there, for example,
historical episodes where it appears that responding
to deviations of money growth from its reference
value would have improved the conduct of mone-
tary policy? Are there also episodes where such a
response encouraged or would have encouraged
inappropriate adjustments in policy?
Figure 2 points to some episodes that might be
useful in assessing the costs and benefits of imple-
menting a reference value for M2 growth in the
United States. It suggests that M2 growth relative to
its reference value seems to have been a good lead-
ing indicator of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s.
Perhaps the best example of an episode in which
money growth provided information that might
have helped to avoid a policy mistake was the late
1960s through the early 1970s. During the late
1960s, utilization rates were increasing to histori-
cally high levels, and inflation was trending upward.
There was political resistance to using fiscal restraint
to slow the economy. Monetary policy ended up
accommodating, and indeed reinforcing, the high
level of aggregate demand, setting the stage for a
significant rise in inflation in advance of the sharp
rise in oil prices in late 1973 and 1974. And Figure 2
shows that money growth, though quite volatile,
generally remained above its reference value during
this period, signaling the inflation risks in the pre-
vailing stance of monetary policy.16
But Figure 3 also flashes some caution about
the usefulness of a reference value, at least after
the early 1980s and especially after the early 1990s.
The Figure allows us to identify several episodes
in which money growth gave potentially mislead-
ing signals about inflation risks. The question in
these cases is whether policymakers had enough
specialized knowledge about financial innovations
or disturbances to make a timely judgment that
the information about money growth should be
discounted.17
The surge in M2 growth in 1983, for example,
was associated largely with regulatory changes
allowing for the introduction of money market
deposit accounts. At the time, policymakers were
well aware of the potential for such effects of dereg-
ulation and hence were not “misled” by the money
growth developments.
Another example is the fall in excess M2 growth
in the early 1990s, which did not portend as steep
a fall in inflation. Instead, it was the result of the
well-known rise in V2 at the time. Reviewing the
discussions in the Bluebook—now part of the public
record—policymakers apparently caught on to this
shift within a year or two.
More recently, the uptick in M2 growth in 1998
seems to have been associated, in part, with the run-
up in equity prices, which raised household wealth
relative to income and, as a consequence, induced
households to rebalance their portfolios. Here, again,
policymakers seem to have caught on quickly.
Money growth accelerated to a rate above 10
percent in the first quarter of 2001. The recent
jump in money growth is evident in Figure 3 where
I have plotted the three-month and two-year growth
rates for M2 along with the reference value. There
is, in general, too much noise, in my view, in the
three-month rate to make it useful for monitoring
the monetary aggregates. But this episode does
provide an opportunity to take note of a variety of
financial developments and special factors that
affect money growth in the short run.
Six factors appear to have contributed to the
upsurge in M2 growth in the first quarter. First, the
policy easings narrowed the opportunity cost of
holding M2 and thereby raised the demand for M2.
Second, the yield curve, while no longer inverted,
is still relatively flat, giving investors little incentive
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16 Interestingly, if we had constructed Figure 2 based on M1 rather than
M2, it would have been less clear that that money growth was incon-
sistent with maintaining low inflation. In the early 1970s, however,
the Federal Reserve had a single money supply measure, correspond-
ing most closely to M1 today. The Federal Reserve discussions of the
monetary aggregates at that time sometimes referred to “adjusted”
measures of the money supply that included, for example, time
deposits and therefore corresponded to what we now call M2. Milton
Friedman at this time was focusing on this broader M2-type measure.
At any rate, the different signals from narrower and broader measures
in the early 1970s highlight the value of monitoring growth rates for
a number of different definitions of the money supply, as the FOMC
routinely did during the period it was setting benchmarks for the
growth of the monetary aggregates.
17 Orphanides and Porter (2001) address precisely this issue.to hold longer maturity assets. Third, stock market
volatility is elevated, making the liquidity and safety
of money more attractive. Fourth, individuals appar-
ently built up M2 balances to a greater extent than
in earlier years to make January tax payments. Fifth,
though these balances typically run off in February,
higher refunds than allowed for by seasonal factors
apparently offset the drag from tax payments. Sixth,
mortgage refinancings have boosted M2 growth, as
funds accumulate in transactions balances before
being remitted to investors. Some or all of these
effects can be quantified, though with considerable
margin of error. At any rate, this is the type of analy-
sis that needs to be undertaken to interpret very
short-run deviations of money growth from the
reference value.
This discussion perhaps only scratches the
surface of the more thorough analysis that would
be required to reach a definitive conclusion about
the costs and benefits of a reference value. Still, it
leaves me with both a recognition of the potential
value of such a reference value and an appreciation
of the challenge associated with wisely using the
information about deviations of money growth
from the reference value.
Let me now sum up my conclusions about the
usefulness of a reference value for money growth
for the United States. First, I would not elevate the
reference value to a second pillar, on a par with the
eclectic approach of adjusting interest rates to
changing economic conditions, as captured in either
pillar two for the ECB or the policy rule in the con-
sensus model. This would overemphasize the
importance of the reference value in the conduct
of monetary policy and thereby ultimately confuse
the markets as they assess the role of money growth
in the conduct of monetary policy.
Second, the purpose of a reference value for
money growth is not to identify money growth as
the policy instrument. It is not. Nor is it to identify
money growth as an intermediate target for mone-
tary policy. It is not. The purpose of the reference
value is to allow money growth to serve as a poten-
tially useful information variable—a potential signal
of inconsistency between prevailing policy and the
medium-term inflation objective. That is, persistent
deviations of money growth from the reference
value might influence monetary policy by raising
questions about the consistency of policy with its
objectives and thereby encouraging a reassessment
of that policy.
Third, money growth is an imperfect information
variable, and, as a result, deviations of money growth
from its reference value have to be carefully evalu-
ated before a judgment is made that policy is incon-
sistent with the medium-term inflation objective.
Finally, given the ability of central banks to
identify and understand financial market innova-
tions and disturbances, they are in a good position
to extract the benefits of the reference value with-
out being misled by the short-run variability and
occasional structural breaks in velocity.
CONCLUSION
Monetarism has had a profound influence on
prevailing views about what monetary policy is
capable of achieving and what monetary policy
cannot do. It has helped to forge a consensus that
central banks are responsible for preventing sus-
tained inflation, and central banks have generally
accepted that responsibility. Monetarism has not,
however, had as great an influence in terms of ele-
vating or even maintaining the role accorded to
money in either macroeconomic modeling or mone-
tary policy. Nevertheless, sometimes the pendulum
swings too far in one direction or another, only to be
corrected later. It may be that we have discounted
the role of money in macro modeling and monetary
policy more than is justified.
I reach three other conclusions from my journey.
First, I believe we have more to learn about the role
that monetary policy can play once the policy rate
is driven to zero. This issue is important today in
Japan. But given the relatively low inflation rates
around the world, especially among industrial
economies and therefore, on average, relatively low
nominal interest rates, it is a subject of interest to a
wider audience. Second, some of what we can learn
from the debate about monetization in Japan may
also enrich our understanding of how monetary
policy works in normal times. Third, I believe mon-
itoring money growth has value, even for central
banks that follow a disciplined strategy of adjusting
their policy rate to ongoing economic develop-
ments. The value may be particularly important at
the extremes: during periods of very high inflation,
as in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United
States, and when the policy rate is driven to zero in
deflationary episodes, as is the case in Japan today.
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